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PROMOTING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

AUGUST 6, 1964.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the
following

REPORT

[To accompany H.J. Res. 1145]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1145), to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On August 5, 1964, the President of the United States transmitted to the Congress a message (H. Doc. 333, 88th Cong., 2d sess.) requesting the Congress to take appropriate action to carry out certain recommendations relative to preserving the peace in southeast Asia. The text of the message follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on Armed Forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 5, 1964.

In response to the request of the President for appropriate congressional action the chairman of the committee, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, introduced House Joint Resolution 1145 on the same day. Identical resolutions were simultaneously introduced by Hon. Frances P. Bolton (H.J. Res. 1146) and by Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (H.J. Res. 1147). In view of the serious situation set forth by the President, the chairman convened an executive session of the committee on August 6 to receive testimony from the Secretary of State, Hon. Dean Rusk; the Secretary of Defense, Hon. Robert S. McNamara; and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on that testimony, the approval of the resolution was warranted and the committee, by a vote of 29 to 0, with 2 members voting present, reported the resolution.

This is not the first time the Congress has had before it resolutions supporting the President in times of serious international tensions. In 1955 Congress passed a resolution relating to the defense of Formosa; in 1957 Congress gave its approval to the President's use of armed forces in the Middle East to resist armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism; and in 1962 with regard to Cuba and to Berlin.

In its consideration of the resolution the committee gave special attention to certain basic questions.

Geographical limits

Section 2 of the resolution expresses the congressional view that "the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia." The resolution does not define geographically the area of

southeast Asia. Incorporated in the resolution, however, is the reference to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the accompanying protocol. That treaty entered into force in February 1955 and was ratified by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Article VIII of the treaty defines the "treaty area" as "the general area of southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21°30' north latitude." The accompanying protocol to which the signatories unanimously subscribed makes clear that the protection accorded by the treaty should extend to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia. While Laos currently is the concern of the International Control Commission and Cambodia has unilaterally taken itself out from the protective arrangement, the language of the resolution is sufficiently clear to permit the inclusion of these two countries.

Secretary Rusk added this further explanation:

* * * It does not cover action to assist any nation not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or a protocol state. It does not cover any action in support of a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in origin. The Southeast Asia Treaty includes a U.S. understanding that it is directed solely against "Communist aggression."

Powers of the President

As it had during earlier action on resolutions relating to Formosa and to the Middle East, the committee considered the relation of the authority contained in the resolution and the powers assigned to the President by the Constitution. While the resolution makes it clear that the people of the United States stand behind the President, it was concluded that the resolution does not enter the field of controversy as to the respective limitations of power in the executive and the legislative branches. As stated in the committee report on the Formosa resolution:

Acting together, there can be no doubt that all the constitutional powers necessary to meet the situation are present.

Duration of resolution

Given the persistent Communist pressures in southeast Asia, the committee did not consider it advisable to insert a specific time limitation on the resolution. The termination of the resolution will be a matter for Presidential determination that "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise." The inclusion of the words "or otherwise" is sufficiently broad to permit the use of alternative courses of action that may bring peace and security to the area such as the effective operation of the several International Control Commissions established under earlier agreements. In any case the resolution specifically reserves to Congress the right to terminate the force of the resolution by concurrent resolution. The language of this section follows closely that incorporated in the Middle East resolution passed by Congress in 1957.

APPENDIX

(Following are the texts of the statements presented to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 6, 1964, by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense.)

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AUGUST 6, 1964

Chairman Morgan and members of the committee, I appear before you in support of the joint congressional resolution on southeast Asia now before your committee. If the committee is agreeable, I shall proceed by explaining the purpose of the resolution. Secretary McNamara will then describe to you the recent attacks on our naval vessels and the U.S. response thereto. I would then propose to conclude by going over the text of the resolution itself and discussing its meaning and scope.

The immediate occasion for this resolution is, of course, the North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels, operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2 and August 4.

However, it is obvious that these attacks were not an isolated event but are related directly to the aggressive posture of North Vietnam and to the policy that the United States has been pursuing in assisting the free nations of southeast Asia and particularly South Vietnam and Laos, to defend themselves against Communist aggression, and thus to preserve the peace of the area.

When Indochina was divided and the independent states of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were created under the conditions of the Geneva accords of 1954, it was at once clear that in the face of the North Vietnamese threat South Vietnam and Laos could not maintain their independence without outside assistance. The Government of South Vietnam turned to the United States for such assistance, and President Eisenhower in December 1954 made the decision that it should be furnished, stating that our purpose was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

In the fall of 1954, Secretary Dulles negotiated, and the Senate in early 1955 consented to, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, sometimes known as the Manila Pact. This treaty provided for the collective defense of the parties to this treaty—Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It provided further that the protection of the treaty should extend, under an annexed protocol, to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia.

I do not need to review for you the subsequent history of North Vietnamese efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and to

do the same in Laos. Having found that South Vietnam would not collapse of itself but was on the contrary making remarkable progress, Hanoi in 1959 initiated a systematic campaign of terror and subversion in South Vietnam, directed and supplied with key personnel and equipment from the north. By 1961, the situation had reached a critical point and the United States greatly increased its advisory and supporting assistance to the Government of South Vietnam.

Despite this assistance, the task of countering the extensive Vietcong effort remains a long and arduous one, and as you know we have moved within the last 2 weeks to further increase our support while recognizing always that the struggle in South Vietnam must essentially be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese themselves.

In Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 have been consistently violated by Hanoi and in May of this year the situation took on a more critical character when a Communist military offensive drove neutralist forces from the area of the Plain of Jars they had held in 1962. Our response to these events, the provision of additional T-28's to the Government of Laos and the carrying out of reconnaissance flights, with the incidents resulting therefrom, are well known to you.

The present attacks, then, are no isolated event. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam, control or conquer Laos, and thus weaken and eventually dominate and conquer other free nations of southeast Asia. One does not need to spell out a "domino theory"; it is enough to recognize the true nature of the Communist doctrine of world revolution and the militant support that Hanoi and Peiping are giving to that doctrine in southeast Asia.

U.S. policy and objectives

Although the United States did not itself sign the Geneva accords of 1954, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith made a formal statement that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We have repeatedly made clear that the independence and security provided for South Vietnam under those accords was a satisfactory status for South Vietnam. All that is needed, as I have myself often said, is for Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone.

The same is true with respect to the 1962 accords for Laos. These provided a reasonable arrangement for the status of Laos, and what is needed, again, is simply that the Communist side should honor the commitments it undertook.

Above all, there can be no doubt of U.S. objectives for these nations and for the area as a whole. Here, as elsewhere, we believe that nations are entitled to remain free and to develop as they see fit. The United States has no military, territorial, or political ambitions for itself in southeast Asia. We seek only the restoration of peace and the removal of Communist subversion and aggression.

Essentially, the outcome of this conflict, and the course of events in the area as a whole, is up to the Communist side. It has the option of accepting the freedom and independence of neighboring nations, or of continuing its aggressive tactics. For our part, as President Johnson stated on June 23: "The United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. But the United States is determined to use

its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace—but not of weakness or timidity.”

Purpose of the resolution

This, then, is the background of the resolution before you. We have never doubted the support of the American people for the policies that have been followed through three administrations over a period of a decade. But in the face of the heightened aggression on the Communist side, exemplified by these latest North Vietnamese attacks, it has seemed clearly wise to seek in the most emphatic form a declaration of congressional support both for the defense of our Armed Forces against similar attacks and for the carrying forward of whatever steps may become necessary to assist the free nations covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty.

We cannot tell what steps may in the future be required to meet Communist aggression in southeast Asia. The unity and determination of the American people, through their Congress, should be declared in terms so firm that they cannot possibly be mistaken by other nations. The world has learned over 50 years of history that aggression is invited if there is doubt about the response. Let us leave today's aggressors in no doubt whatever.

I now turn to Secretary McNamara, who will describe the recent attacks and our response.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, AUGUST 6,
1964

Chairman Morgan and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, during the past few days, deliberate and unprovoked military attacks by the North Vietnamese have given rise to the need for us to appear here today. I should like to review the attacks with you briefly and to describe the responses we made to those attacks.

The first incident occurred on August 2. It concerned the U.S.S. *Maddox*, one of our destroyers engaged in a routine patrol in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnam coast. At about noon, when the *Maddox* was about 30 miles from the coast, she reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at a range of over 10 miles.

Two hours later, at approximately 2:40 p.m., the *Maddox* was approached by a high speed—45 to 50 knot—craft. She reported that the apparent intention of this craft was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. She was attacked by the three PT craft at 3:08 p.m. She opened fire with her 5-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers. The PT's continued their closing maneuvers, and two of the PT's closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The *Maddox* changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed on the starboard side at a distance of 100 to 200 yards.

The U.S.S. *Ticonderoga*, which was operating in waters to the southeast and which had been alerted to the impending attack, advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E (Crusader) fighters with rockets and 20-millimeter ammunition to provide air cover for the *Maddox*. At about 3:21 p.m., the third hostile PT moved up to the

beam of the *Maddox* and received a direct hit by a 5-inch round; at the same time it dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machinegun fire from the PT's was directed at the *Maddox*. However, there was no injury to personnel and no damage. The *Maddox* continued in a southerly direction to join with a sister destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*, as *Ticonderoga* aircraft commenced attacking the PT's. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 millimeter strafing attacks were directed against two of the PT's, and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the *Maddox*. At 3:29 p.m., the engagement terminated and the aircraft escorted the *Maddox* southward on its patrol course.

On Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements with enemy craft. He instructed the Navy, first, to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; third, to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers; and fourth, to issue instructions to the combat aircraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack any force which attacked them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it.

At the same time as these instructions were being broadcast throughout the world, the State Department, acting pursuant to the President's further instructions, took steps to deliver a note of protest to the North Vietnam regime. The note was also widely publicized. It concluded with the words, "The U.S. Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Vietnam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against U.S. forces."

Our hopes that the firm defensive action taken in response to the first attack and the protest to Hanoi would end the matter were short lived.

After the first attack on Sunday, the *Maddox* joined with its sister destroyer, the U.S.S. *Turner Joy*, in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed its patrol in international waters, as directed by the President.

Monday, August 3, was uneventful.

The patrol was also uneventful during most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, August 4. In the early evening of August 4, however, the *Maddox* reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the *Turner Joy*. It was 7:40 p.m. when the *Maddox* reported that, from actions being taken by those unidentified vessels, an attack by them appeared imminent. At this time the *Maddox* was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land.

The *Maddox* at 8:36 p.m. established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time, U.S. fighter aircraft were launched from the *Ticonderoga* to rendezvous with the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* to provide protection against possible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. Shortly thereafter, the *Maddox* reported that the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from its radar screen and that the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. The aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* arrived and commenced defensive patrol over the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*.

At 9:30 p.m., additional unidentified vessels were observed on the *Maddox* radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued to close rapidly from the west and south and the *Maddox* reported that their intentions were evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported at 9:52 p.m. that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire.

Within the next hour, the destroyers relayed messages stating that they had avoided a number of torpedos, that they had been under repeated attack, and that they had sunk two of the attacking craft. By midnight local time, the destroyers reported that, even though many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits or casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* were illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft. Shortly thereafter, they reported that at least two enemy craft had been sunk although low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations. The *Turner Joy* reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights.

Finally, after more than 2 hours under attack, the destroyers reported at 1:30 a.m. that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement.

The deliberate and unprovoked nature of the attacks at locations that were indisputably in international waters compelled the President and his principal advisers to conclude that a prompt and firm military response was required. Accordingly, the President decided that air action, in reply to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday evening, after consulting with congressional leadership, he so informed the American people.

The U.S. military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. The U.S. air strikes began approximately at noon Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gunboats, their bases and support facilities. These reprisal attacks, carried out by naval aircraft of the U.S. 7th Fleet from the carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Constellation*, were limited in scale—their primary targets being the weapons against which our patrolling destroyers had been forced to defend themselves twice in the prior 72 hours.

Specifically, our naval air forces launched 64 attack sorties against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a major supporting oil storage depot. Strike reports indicate that all targets were severely hit, in particular the petroleum installation where 10 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90 percent destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet. Some 25 North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.

Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged. One of the pilots is believed to have crashed with his plane between two PT craft he had under attack. Another pilot reported that he was ejecting from his downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at present listed as unknown.

In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to deter escalation is to be prepared for it, the President and his principal advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were re-

quired in southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area are therefore now underway. These include:

- (a) transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific coast to the western Pacific;
- (b) movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;
- (c) movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;
- (d) transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;
- (e) movement of an antisubmarine force into the South China Sea; and
- (f) the alerting and reading for movement of selected Army and Marine Forces.

In the meantime, U.S. destroyers with protective air cover as needed, continued their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are in my judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps can be taken very rapidly if the situation requires.

This concludes my descriptions of the two deliberate and unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas; of the U.S. reprisal against the offending boats, their bases and related facilities; and of the precautionary deployment and alerting steps we have taken to guard against any eventuality.

(Continuation of statement of Secretary Rusk, August 6, 1964:)

I now turn to the specifics of the resolution before you.

The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself. It spells out in the simplest and shortest terms possible the fact of North Vietnamese attacks, their relation to the overall campaign of aggression by North Vietnam, and the purposes and objectives of the United States in southeast Asia.

As to the operative sections of the resolution, section 1 declares the approval and support of the Congress for actions, in response to armed attack on U.S. forces, which the President has the authority and obligation to take in his capacity as Commander in Chief.

Turning next to section 2 of the draft resolution, let me make clear at the outset what the resolution does not embrace. It does not cover action to assist any nation not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or a protocol state. It does not cover any action in support of a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in origin. The Southeast Asia Treaty includes a U.S. understanding that is directed solely against "Communist aggression."

The language, "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," is similar to the authority embraced in the Formosa resolution of 1955, the Middle East resolution of 1957, and the Cuba resolution of 1962. Copies of each of these have been made available to you for comparative purposes. The Formosa resolution authorized the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States." The Middle East resolution stated that the United States was "prepared to use armed forces." The nearest parallel to the language of the present resolution is in the first clause of the Cuba resolution, that the United States is "determined * * * to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms" Cuban subversive activities extending to any part of the hemisphere.

I shall not take your time this morning to review the constitutional aspects of resolutions of this character. I believe it to be the generally accepted constitutional view that the President has the constitutional authority to take at least limited armed action in defense of American national interests; in at least 85 instances, Presidents of the United States have in fact taken such action. As I have said before, we cannot now be sure what actions may be required. The Formosa resolution of 1955 was followed by the use of U.S. warships to escort supply convoys to the offshore islands in 1958; the Middle East resolution was followed by President Eisenhower's sending of troops to Lebanon in 1958; the Cuba resolution was followed by the well-known events of October 1962. I do not suggest that any of these actions may serve as a parallel for what may be required in southeast Asia. There can be no doubt, however, that these previous resolutions form a solid legal precedent for the action now proposed. Such action is required to make the purposes of the United States clear and to protect our national interests.

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